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I. INTRODUCTION 
When industrial employees are injured by exposure to harmful 
materials, they often sue not only their employer, but the original 
supplier of the materials as well.  Failure to warn claims constitute a 
major part of these industrial lawsuits, which help keep failure to 
warn among the most frequently filed products liability actions.1  
Minnesota currently allows plaintiffs to hold suppliers of raw 
materials liable for failure to warn.2  Because Minnesota products 
liability law is still incomplete,3 however, these industrial suppliers 
are subject to an inefficient, often confusing set of legal standards.4 
In Gray v. Badger Mining Corp.,5 a decision likely to provide 
some clarification and assistance to industrial suppliers, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court designed a multi-faceted approach for 
analyzing failure to warn litigation.  While retaining a negligence-
based methodology, the court identified specific defenses available 
under “common fact patterns” found in industrial failure to warn 
litigation.6  Some of the defenses—those most closely related to the 
actions, knowledge, or abilities of the plaintiff—absolve the 
defendant of any duty to warn.7  Others, relating to the actions, 
knowledge, or abilities of intermediaries, are more fact-specific, 
requiring the balancing of a number of elements.8  The 
sophisticated intermediary doctrine—the primary focus of this 
Note—belongs in the latter category of defenses. 
The Gray court limited its holding to the facts of the case,9 but 
 
 1. Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User 
Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1988). 
 2. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (citing 
Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987)). 
 3. Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law 
and The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 2 
(1998) (comparing existing Minnesota products liability law to the new 
Restatement (Third)). 
 4. See, e.g., Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship between Chemical Manufacturers, 
Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 563 (1991) (discussing 
inefficiencies in tort system relating to industrial failure to warn actions). 
 5. 676 N.W.2d at 268. 
 6. Id. at 275. 
 7. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 8. See infra Parts III.D–E, IV. 
 9. 676 N.W.2d at 281. 
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its adoption of specific defenses will no doubt shape future 
litigation.  Taken as a whole, the defenses acknowledge the 
difficulties facing industrial defendant-suppliers without 
eliminating protection for potential plaintiff-employees.  As a 
result, they should lead to more equitable results in industrial 
failure to warn litigation. 
This Note briefly examines the context of Minnesota failure to 
warn claims against industrial suppliers.  It describes the various 
defenses Gray has made available, particularly the sophisticated 
intermediary and bulk supplier doctrines.  The Note also reviews 
the various jurisdictional incarnations of the sophisticated 
intermediary defense, and analyzes the doctrine’s application in 
Gray.  Additionally, the Note attempts to predict Gray’s future, 
recommending that the sophisticated intermediary defense not be 
expanded beyond the employment context, and suggesting that the 
Gray defenses, viewed as a cohesive whole, will quickly get rid of 
weaker claims while permitting valid claims to go forward.  Finally, 
the Note concludes that the multi-faceted approach adopted in 
Gray should permit generally fairer outcomes in industrial failure 
to warn cases. 
II. FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS 
Although the Gray holding has been described as “extend[ing] 
the duty of suppliers of hazardous products,”10 the common law 
duty of such suppliers to warn ultimate users actually existed well 
before Gray.  As early as 1919, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
“as a general rule, the manufacturer or compounder of articles for 
the market, containing deadly ingredients or qualities, owes a duty 
to those into whose hands the articles may come to suitably convey 
notice of the danger . . . . This is generally done by naming or 
properly labeling the package.”11 
 
 10. Marshall H. Tanick, Changing Times: A Tale of Three Torts, BENCH & B. OF 
MINN., May/June 2004, at 24.  Mr. Tanick’s article primarily discusses the torts of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, but refers 
briefly to Gray to support the proposition that the Minnesota Supreme Court is not 
“anti-plaintiff.” Id. 
 11. McCrossin v. Noyes Bros. & Cutler, Inc., 143 Minn. 181, 184–85, 173 N.W. 
566, 567 (1919).  In McCrossin, a patient at a mental institution died after adding 
an insecticide known as “Roach Doom” to his coffee.  The administratrix of his 
estate sued both the manufacturer and the seller of Roach Doom.  The court, 
although it allowed the complaint to be amended to state a cause of action, 
speculated that the compound’s name itself—Roach Doom—might be sufficient 
3
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Originally, Minnesota failure to warn claims were based on 
negligence principles.12  Then, in 1967, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted strict liability standards for failure to warn.13 During 
the 1980s, however, the court moved back toward negligence 
standards14 until negligence and strict liability for failure to warn 
became virtually indistinguishable.15 
In Gray, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s 
negligence-based failure to warn cause of action, expressly 
deferring examination of the strict liability claims also filed by 
Gray.16  This comports with current trends; a number of courts are 
moving toward analyzing failure to warn claims in terms of 
negligence, rather than strict liability,17 and Gray appears to be 
another step in that direction. 
Minnesota is hardly alone in its attempts to return to 
negligence analysis for failure to warn, as shown by the approach 
 
to constitute a warning to humans. Id. at 186, 173 N.W. at 568. 
 12. George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota, the 
New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care 
Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (“Failure to warn in Minnesota 
has its roots in negligence law.”); see also Hartmon v. Nat’l Heater Co., 240 Minn. 
264, 272, 60 N.W.2d 804, 810 (1953) (holding that where a manufacturer 
undertakes to provide instructions, failure to give “accurate and adequate” 
warning may constitute negligence). 
 13. Steenson, supra note 3, at 2 (citing McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 
Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)). 
 14. Soule & Moen, supra note 12, at 391-92 (observing that during the 1980s, 
Minnesota adopted a negligence standard for failure to warn and citing Germann 
v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986)). 
 15. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 926 n.4; see also Steven J. Kirsch, Defenses—
Sophisticated User and Learned Intermediary, 5A MINN. PRAC. SERIES: METHODS OF PRAC. 
§ 6.84 (3d ed. 1990) (“Minnesota has recognized that strict liability for failure to 
warn is based upon negligence concepts and, in a warning context, there is no 
difference between strict liability and negligence.”). 
 16. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn. 2004). 
 17. Steenson, supra note 3, at 22 (“[T]he court has also stated that negligence 
principles apply in strict liability context.”) (citing Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989); Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 
430 N.W.2d 465, 467 n.1 (Minn. 1988); Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 926 n.4); see also 
John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft No. 2 of the 
Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361, 368 (1995) (“[I]t appears strict 
liability is becoming more like negligence law with its traditional standard of 
reasonable care . . . .”); Hildy Bowbeer, Wendy F. Lumish, & Jeffrey A. Cohen, 
Warning!  Failure to Read This Article May Be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn Defense, 
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439, 444 (2000) (“[I]t is apparent that the strict liability 
approach to warnings law has been, or is in the process of being, supplanted with 
the negligence-based reasonableness standard as to whether a manufacturer failed 
to warn.”). 
4
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taken by the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability.18  Although the Restatement does not specifically 
prescribe either a negligence or strict liability methodology,19 it 
describes failure to warn liability as achieving “the same general 
objectives as does liability predicated on negligence.”20  The 
reporters who authored the Restatement have also come out in 
favor of negligence-type liability over strict liability for all branches 
of products liability except manufacturing defects.21  It seems that 
negligence principles may have unseated strict liability in failure to 
warn litigation, at least for the foreseeable future. 
In addition to the tension between strict liability and 
negligence, there exists among torts scholars a question of how tort 
law balances the competing interests of before-the-fact deterrence 
of legal wrongs and after-the-fact “corrective justice” when a tort 
has been committed.22  One commentator has proposed that 
negligence law “at stage one, seeks to deter negligence generally . . 
. then, at stage two, acknowledges the incomplete success of its 
 
 18. The Restatement attempts to introduce more consistency among 
jurisdictions.  Professor James Henderson, one of the Reporters responsible for 
the Restatement, has said, “[t]he revision . . . is not a reform measure.  We are 
trying to read the cases and by and large conform to the trends that we see in 
them.”  James Henderson, Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social 
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 111 (1993) (discussing the development of the 
(at that time) unfinished Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); see also Soule & 
Moen, supra note 12, at 389–90 (“The Restatement (Third) avoids the 
complications of labeling this product liability theory as either negligence or strict 
liability,” but pointing out that the Restatement advocates a “reasonable care 
approach.”). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
 21. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 377 (2002) (postulating that negligence is ethically superior and more 
viable than strict liability); Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter’s Perspective: A Proposed 
Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1993) (noting that analysis of failure to warn 
cases in the new Restatement is intended to be “negligence-like in its approach” 
although not necessarily identical to “traditional negligence”). 
 22. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:  Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (proposing a “mixed theory” of tort 
law that balances corrective justice and deterrence). Kenneth Simons also 
discusses the values expressed through tort law: 
In the end, a determination that an actor is negligent reflects a value 
judgment at two levels.  It expresses the judgment that the actor should 
have done something different in light of the foreseeable risks of his 
conduct.  It also presupposes value judgments about the relevant 
advantages and disadvantages of taking such a precaution. 
Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Encompassing Fairness As Well As Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 935 (2001). 
5
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stage-one effort and accordingly recognizes the corrective justice 
rights of those who have been victimized by negligence.”23 
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to address these 
principles in Gray.  By employing multiple defenses with differing 
applications, the court has modified an industrial supplier’s duty to 
warn without completely eliminating that duty. 
Although the newly identified defenses fall short of a perfectly 
predictable, bright-line rule, suppliers will have a better idea of 
when they are expected to warn because the doctrines are applied 
differently depending on whether the court is focusing on an end 
user or an intermediary employer.  Suppliers will also have greater 
flexibility in providing those warnings; when reasonable, they may 
rely on an intermediary employer to pass along the warning to the 
ultimate users of the material.24  At the same time, the 
reasonableness requirement deters suppliers from unreasonably 
abandoning warnings altogether because plaintiffs may still recover 
through the corrective justice system found in Minnesota tort law. 
III. THE GRAY DECISION 
Lawrence B. Gray (“Gray”) worked for the same company for 
more than forty-seven years, from 1951 to 1998, except for two 
years of military service in Korea.25  His employer, Smith Foundry, 
used silica sand in its casting processes and purchased a significant 
portion of its sand in bulk from Badger Mining Corporation 
(“Badger”).26  During his employment with Smith Foundry, plaintiff 
Gray was exposed to silica dust created by normal foundry 
procedures.27 
Although providers and users of sand have long known silica 
dust to be dangerous,28 Smith Foundry did not begin receiving 
warnings from its suppliers about silica’s particular hazards to 
 
 23. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1828 (describing deterrence and corrective 
justice theories as both “complementary” and “concurrent”). 
 24. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 277–78 (Minn. 2004). 
 25. Id. at 271. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  The sand is used to make molds for metal casting.  Once an item is 
cast, the sand is forcefully removed from the casting by processes such as “knock 
off, shake out, chipping, and grinding.” Appellant’s Brief at 7, Gray (No. C4-02-
2052). 
 28. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 5, Gray (No. C4-02-2052) 
(citations omitted). 
6
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foundry workers until the 1970s.29  By the 1980s, Smith Foundry 
had brought itself into compliance with the silica exposure 
standards required by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”),30 but apparently this was insufficient to 
protect employees like Gray.31  Although Gray wore disposable 
respirators supplied by his employer,32 he contracted silicosis, a 
lung injury caused by inhaling silica particles.33 
Gray sued Badger and other sand suppliers for, among other 
claims,34 negligent failure to warn that the disposable respirators he 
used did not sufficiently protect against silicosis.35  The defendants 
filed motions for summary judgment.36  The district court denied 
these motions, whereupon all defendants except Badger settled.37  
Badger renewed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that it had no duty to warn Gray “because it sold raw material to a 
 
 29. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Bergfeld v. Unimin Corp., 319 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2003).  Bergfeld is a 
similar case out of Iowa, where the plaintiff was exposed to silica sand at the 
foundry where he worked.  Id. at 352.  Although plaintiff Bergfeld was never 
exposed to concentrations of sand above the limit set by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), in 1974, another agency, the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) recommended a much 
lower limit for silica exposure.  Id.  The NIOSH recommendation was not binding 
on employers, and plaintiff claimed that defendant supplier failed to warn him of 
this lower limit. Id. at 353.  The Bergfeld court, however, found evidence in the 
record that the employer foundry’s subjective knowledge of the NIOSH 
recommendation was equal to the defendant supplier’s knowledge. Id. at 354.  
Although the Bergfeld court was using “sophisticated user” terminology, the 
doctrine it applied most closely resembles the “sophisticated intermediary” 
defense defined in Gray. 
 32. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 272.  Many conventional respirators do not 
sufficiently filter out tiny silica particles; at a minimum, the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health, commonly known as NIOSH, recommends 
“respirators with high-efficiency particulate HEPA filters.” Brief of Amici Curiae 
Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 6, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). 
 33. Gray, 664 N.W.2d at 883. Although silica sand is not dangerous in and of 
itself, foundry procedures fracture the sand into imperceptible “sub-micron-sized 
particles . . . undetectable by senses of sight, smell, or touch.” Id.  These 
infinitesimal, airborne dust particles may be drawn into the lungs and cause 
permanent damage.  Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 4, Gray “No. 
C4-02-2052). 
 34. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 273.  The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to 
address Gray’s claims for strict liability for failure to warn, as well as his claims for 
breach of warranties of merchantability and fitness for the intended purpose.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 271. 
 36. Id. at 272–73. 
 37. Id. at 273. 
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sophisticated purchaser.”38  This motion was also denied.39  The 
parties then took the unusual step of stipulating to an entry of 
judgment for Gray, with the damage amount contingent upon the 
results of an appeal of the denial of Badger’s summary judgment 
motion.40 
The court of appeals held that Smith Foundry, Gray’s 
employer, was a “sophisticated purchaser”41 of silica sand because it 
“knew or should have known of the dangers of silica.”42  The 
appeals court then looked primarily to Eighth Circuit cases before 
deciding that Badger, as “a bulk supplier of silica sand to a 
sophisticated purchaser” had “no duty to warn the user of the 
dangers of exposure to silica dust.”43  Gray appealed. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the duty to 
warn and Badger’s raw material/component part supplier 
defense.44  Two amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of 
Badger: one by the American Chemistry Council45 another by the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  If the appeal process determined that summary judgment should have 
been entered for Badger, Gray would receive $17,500; otherwise, Gray would 
receive $75,000.  The supreme court noted that such a stipulation was unusual and 
was not authorized under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. at 273 n.2.  
Because the parties had consented and the appeals court had accepted it, the 
supreme court declined to assert judgment, however. Id. 
 41. The appellate court appeared to treat the “sophisticated purchaser” and 
“learned intermediary” doctrines as identical.  Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 
N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004).  The 
supreme court addressed this possible ambiguity in its opinion:  “although the 
court of appeals mentioned . . . the learned intermediary defense, it ultimately 
analyzed the case under ‘sophisticated user’ and ‘bulk supplier’ defenses 
. . . . [W]e decline to extend the learned intermediary defense to the 
employer/employee relationship in the industrial context.”  Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 
276 (citations omitted).  Later in its opinion, however, the supreme court did 
expressly distinguish the learned intermediary defense from the sophisticated user 
and sophisticated intermediary defenses.  Id. at 275–77. 
 42. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004). 
 43. Id. at 886.  Minnesota courts may “determine as a matter of law whether 
there exists a duty to warn of a danger in a product.”  Id. at 884 (citing Germann v. 
F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986)). 
 44. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 273. 
 45. Brief of Amici Curiae American Chemistry Council, Gray (No. C4-02-
2052).  The American Chemistry Council (“ACC”) is an organization representing 
“the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry” and companies who 
make and supply “industrial chemical products.”  Id. at 3.  The Gray court 
expressly states that the sand sold by Badger fits under the legal definition of a 
“chemical.” Gray, 676 N.W.2d 268 at 274 n.3 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
8
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Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc.46 jointly with the American Tort 
Reform Association (“ATRA”).47  A third amicus brief was filed by 
the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association in support of Gray.48 
In its opinion, issued March 18, 2004, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court found sufficient issues of material fact existed to preclude 
summary judgment, in essence finding for Gray because of the 
parties’ pre-existing stipulation.49  The court carefully limited its 
holding to the case’s specific procedural and factual scope.50 
Despite the scrupulously defined parameters of the court’s 
opinion, Gray will no doubt significantly affect future failure to 
warn litigation, especially in the industrial employment context.  In 
its “duty to warn” analysis, the Gray court identified and defined a 
number of specific defenses available to industrial supplier 
defendants.  The five defenses outlined in the court’s opinion are: 
“(1) learned intermediary; (2) sophisticated user; (3) sophisticated 
intermediary; (4) bulk supplier; and (5) raw material/component 
part supplier.”51 
Two of the defenses are not new to the Minnesota court.  The 
learned intermediary defense had already been authorized in 
 
§ 1910.1200(c)(2003)). 
 46. Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American 
Tort Reform Association, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).  The Coalition for Litigation 
Justice (formerly the Coalition for Asbestos Justice) was formed by a group of 
property and casualty insurers whose goal is “to address and improve the silica and 
other toxic tort litigation environment.”  Id. at 1. 
 47. The American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) is a “coalition of more 
than 300 businesses, corporations, municipalities, associations, and professional 
firms” who support “an aggressive civil justice reform agenda.”  Some of ATRA’s 
goals include: “abolition of the rule of joint and several liability,” “limits on 
punitive damages,” “limits on noneconomic damages,” and “stopping regulation 
through litigation.” AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, About ATRA, at 
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2004). 
 48. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).  
The Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association (“MTLA”) is an association of primarily 
plaintiff’s attorneys who list as one of their objectives “to advance the cause of 
those who are damaged in person, property or civil rights and who must seek 
redress therefore at law.”  MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Mission 
Statement, at http://www.mntla.com/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004). 
 49. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 281–82 (noting that the court determined that 
fact issues existed regarding whether the warnings provided by Badger fell short of 
federal requirements or were otherwise inadequate regarding the types of 
respirators that should be used to prevent silica inhalation). 
 50. See id. at 281 (limiting the decision to the “unique procedural posture and 
particular facts in the record”). 
 51. Id. at 275. 
9
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Minnesota for pharmaceutical manufacturers.52  Additionally, 
principles of the sophisticated user defense have long been 
recognized in Minnesota.53 
In addition to its discussion of existing defenses, the Gray court 
took the opportunity to identify three additional defenses for 
application in Minnesota.  First, the court adopted the Raw 
Materials/Component Supplier defense from the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 5.54  This defense has 
been thoroughly discussed by commentators and is fairly 
straightforward in its application.55  The other two defenses, 
sophisticated intermediary and bulk supplier, were taken from 
section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.56  These “new” 
defenses are likely to cause the greatest changes in the litigation of 
industrial failure to warn claims. 
The sophisticated intermediary and bulk supplier defenses are 
the primary focus of this Note, but, to provide context, all five 
defenses are discussed briefly in the following section. 
A. The Learned Intermediary Defense 
As described by the court, the learned intermediary defense 
applies where a pharmaceutical maker fails to warn an already 
knowledgeable physician of a hazard posed by the manufacturer’s 
pharmaceutical product, and a patient is subsequently injured by 
the product.57  The learned intermediary defense applies principles 
of causation; when a physician is fully knowledgeable of the 
 
 52. Id. at 276 (citing Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 335–36, 181 
N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970)). 
 53. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77 (citing Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 
Minn. 336, 340–44, 156 N.W.2d 898, 902–04 (1968)). 
 54. Id. at 280-81 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. 
b (1998)). 
 55. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: 
Encouraging The Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1224-25 (1996) (comparing raw material and bulk supplier 
defenses); Steenson, supra note 3, at 32-34 (commenting on the Restatement 
(Third) and its likely effect on Minnesota law).  The Gray court adopted this 
defense from the Restatement (Third) but did not expressly adopt the language of 
the Restatement dealing with failure to warn claims. See 676 N.W.2d at 274 
(endorsing “the broad statement of principles contained in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388 [1965]”) (emphasis added)). 
 56. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278, 280 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 388 cmt. n (1965)). 
 57. Id. at 275-76 (citing Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 335-36, 
181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970)). 
10
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product’s dangers, the pharmaceutical company’s failure to warn is 
held not to be the proximate cause of the injury.58 
The Gray court pointed out that the learned intermediary 
defense “has essentially been limited to pharmaceutical products.”59  
Although the court recognized that the learned intermediary 
defense may be available in a few other professional contexts,60 it 
specifically declined to extend the learned intermediary defense to 
industrial employment situations.61  However, because Badger did 
not argue to the court for the learned intermediary defense,62 the 
court’s discussion of the doctrine is probably dictum, and awaits 
clarification by subsequent litigation. 
B. The Raw Material/Component Part Supplier Defense 
As already noted, the Raw Material/Component Part Supplier 
defense is derived from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability.63  For the defense to apply in Minnesota, the component 
must be “inherently safe”64 when it is supplied to a manufacturer.  
The supplier then has no duty to warn either the buyer or the 
ultimate user of the final product in which the component is used, 
particularly if the component is a basic material that can be put to 
“multiple uses.”65 
The court declined to apply this defense to Badger, holding 
that Badger was not a supplier of either safe raw materials or 
 
 58. Id. at 276. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, 
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821–22 (Minn. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 458 
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
 61. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276.  In Gray, the court mentioned with approval a 
Minnesota Court of Appeals case containing a “well summarized” discussion 
differentiating the medical and industrial employment contexts. Id. at 276 n.5 
(citing Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 280–81.  The Gray court quotes the following section from the 
Restatement: 
[W]hen a sophisticated buyer integrates a component into another 
product, the component seller owes no duty to warn either the 
immediate buyer or the ultimate consumers of dangers arising because 
the component is unsuited for the special purpose to which the buyer 
puts it. 
Id. at 281 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998)). 
 64. Id. at 280–81. 
 65. Id. at 281. 
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component parts.66 As a result, this section of the opinion is also 
likely dictum.  Significantly, however, the court stated that “[e]ven 
where this defense is applicable, the supplier must still provide an 
adequate warning to the intermediate purchaser,” particularly 
where the supplier’s knowledge is “superior” to the purchaser’s.67  
This means that for a raw material/component part supplier to 
have no duty to the ultimate user, the intermediary employer must 
be knowledgeable regarding any hazards of the material. 
C. The Sophisticated User Defense 
The sophisticated user doctrine is commonly used in failure to 
warn litigation and is available in most jurisdictions.68  As applied in 
Gray, the sophisticated user defense is essentially a bright-line, no-
duty defense that relieves a supplier of dangerous material from 
the duty to warn an ultimate user if the supplier “has reason to 
believe that the user will realize [the material’s] dangerous 
condition.”69  The defense originated from section 388 of the 
Restatement of Torts, which carried over, without any change, to 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.70  The Minnesota Supreme 
 
 66. See id. (finding that the sand was not inherently safe when “used in a 
foundry process,” and that the sand did not become a “component of a finished 
product”).  Therefore, although the court did not expressly so state, the raw 
material/component supplier defense could not apply in this case. 
 67. Id.  In contrast, in their brief, the Coalition for Litigation Justice and 
ATRA claimed that the duty to warn should not lie with the supplier, but with the 
employer.  Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and 
American Tort Reform Association at 15–19, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). 
 68. “[I]t would appear, then, that some version of a ‘sophisticated purchaser’ 
defense is the norm in most jurisdictions.” Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 
1191, 1197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992) (quoting In re 
Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986)). 
 69. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276. 
 70. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) reads as follows: 
 
§388.  Chattel Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use 
 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another 
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to 
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its 
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the 
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the 
supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
12
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Court expressly endorsed section 388 in 1959.71  The court took 
notice of the Second Restatement section in 1967,72 and recognized 
the principles of the sophisticated user defense (without referring 
to it by name) in 1968.73  In Gray, the court reaffirmed its 
endorsement of the Second Restatement, confirming the defense’s 
place in Minnesota jurisprudence.74 
D. The Sophisticated Intermediary Defense75 
The newly named sophisticated intermediary defense, 
identified in Gray, applies when a supplier can demonstrate that it 
reasonably discharged its duty to warn an end user by relying on an 
informed intermediary to give the actual warning. 76  Although the 
Minnesota court identified the defense for the first time in Gray,77 
its elements are not new.  As early as 1923, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated that “an instrument which may be dangerous and is 
generally known to the . . . profession as a danger need not be 
warned against by a seller.”78 
Over the years, jurisdictions have applied the defense in 
various ways.  Some require the same elements but use different 
nomenclature, including “sophisticated purchaser,”79 
“knowledgeable purchaser,”80 and “knowledgeable, sophisticated 
employer.”81  Others evaluate the intermediary’s duty under the 
 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous 
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
 71. See Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 504–05, 99 N.W.2d 76, 79–80 (1959). 
 72. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333 n.1, 154 N.W.2d 
488, 497 n.1 (1967). 
 73. See Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 340–44, 156 N.W.2d 
898, 902–04 (1968). 
 74. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77. 
 75. The court may have selected the name for this defense from an amicus 
brief which referred to Smith Foundry as a “‘sophisticated’ intermediary user.” 
Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American Tort 
Reform Association at 14, Gray (No. C4-02-2052).  The MTLA’s brief also used the 
term but treated it as interchangeable with “learned intermediary.”  Brief of Amici 
Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 8–9, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). 
 76. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 276–77. 
 77. Id. at 277. 
 78. Rosebrock v. Gen. Elec. Co. & Tonawanda Power Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 238–
39 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1923). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1205–08 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 80. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 739 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 81. See, e.g., Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 561 (W.D. Va. 
1984), aff’d sub nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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already existing sophisticated user analysis.82  Still others merely 
extend the pharmaceutically related learned intermediary 
defense.83  A few courts will not permit the sophisticated 
intermediary defense at all, especially in strict liability cases.84 
According to the Gray decision, Minnesota now permits the 
sophisticated intermediary defense, but distinguishes it from the 
learned intermediary and sophisticated user doctrines.85  
Additionally, unlike the sophisticated user defense, the 
sophisticated intermediary defense in Minnesota is not a no-duty 
defense; it does not obviate a Minnesota supplier’s original duty to 
warn.86 
E. The Bulk Supplier Defense 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court discusses the bulk 
supplier and sophisticated intermediary defenses separately, the 
two are complementary.  The bulk supplier defense is a “specialized 
version” of the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, dealing with 
the supply of bulk industrial materials to an informed 
intermediary.87  Because the two correspond so closely, discussion 
of the sophisticated intermediary defense often includes the bulk 
supplier defense by implication.88 
 
 82. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1194–99 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990); Tasca v. GTE Prod. Corp., 438 N.W.2d 625, 628–29 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1988); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487, 495–502 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 83. See, e.g., Stuckey v. N. Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 
1989).  See generally Cheney, supra note 4, at 562 (recommending extension of 
learned intermediary defense to employers).  The Gray court expressly rejected 
this option.  676 N.W.2d 268, 275–76 (Minn. 2004). 
 84. See, e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(declining to fuse sophisticated user and bulk seller defenses because it would 
undercut strict liability); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1012–
13 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to fuse sophisticated user and bulk supplier 
defenses; also refusing to apply learned intermediary defense to employer–
employee relationship).  But see Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 
671 F. Supp. 1055, 1058–60 (D. Md. 1987) (permitting sophisticated user defense 
in strict liability claim against bulk supplier); Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories 
Co., 630 A.2d 874, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (permitting sophisticated user 
defense to strict liability claims against bulk silica supplier); Wood v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 119 S.W.3d 870, 874 (applying bulk supplier doctrine to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A failure to warn claim). 
 85. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 275–80. 
 86. Id. at 278. 
 87. Id. at 280. 
 88. Id. 
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Basically, the bulk supplier defense applies when it would be 
“exceedingly costly” or “impossible” for a supplier of industrial bulk 
material to warn every end user of that material directly.89  
Minnesota still requires a bulk supplier to provide adequate 
warnings to intermediary purchasers for dissemination to ultimate 
users,90 so the bulk supplier, like the sophisticated intermediary, is 
not a no-duty defense. 
IV. THE SOPHISTICATED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE APPLIED IN GRAY 
Generally, courts adopting a sophisticated intermediary 
defense have taken one of three routes.91  The first is a common-
law, “no-duty” approach: once a relevant intermediary (generally 
the user’s employer) is warned, the manufacturer no longer has a 
duty to warn the end user.92  The second focuses on the supplier’s 
reasonableness in relying on an intermediary to give the actual 
warning.93  Some jurisdictions refer to this as “delegating” the duty 
to warn.94  The third approach combines the previous two.  Like the 
second approach, it examines whether a supplier was reasonable in 
relying on an intermediary, but it also emphasizes the supplier’s 
continuing duty to the end user.95  This appears to be the approach 
adopted in Gray.  The court requires a supplier to demonstrate 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Willner, supra note 1, at 590–606 (discussing differences between the 
three approaches to sophisticated user defense). Willner also notes that a few 
courts analyze such cases under causation, with limited success. Id. at 588–89 n.47. 
 92. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990); Stuckey 
v. N. Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1989); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson 
Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 93. Willner, supra note 1, at 596–604 (discussing Restatement analysis of 
sophisticated user); see, e.g., Baker v. Monsanto Co., 962 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Ind. 
1997); Hegna v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 822 (D. Minn. 
1992); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff’d sub 
nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); Younger v. Dow Corning Corp., 
451 P.2d 177 (Kan. 1969); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
 94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Monsanto Co., 150 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1998); Adams v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984); Vines v. Beloit Corp., 631 So. 
2d 1003 (Ala. 1994). 
 95. Willner, supra note 1, at 605–06 (discussing “mixed” approach to 
sophisticated user defense); see, e.g., Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 
(7th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 
1978); Dole Food Co., Inc. v. N.C. Foam Indus., Inc., 935 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1997); Jodway v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Haase 
v. Badger Mining Corp., 669 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
15
Nelson: Case Note: Tort Law—Shades of Gray: The Sophisticated Intermediar
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
NELSON (CB & CKI & LSK) 11/14/2004  6:01:39 PM 
674 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
“that it used reasonable care in relying upon the intermediary” to 
warn,96 but the supplier cannot itself be absolved of the duty.97 
In adopting its sophisticated intermediary defense, the Gray 
court applied the balancing test found in section 388 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.98  Under the Restatement, a court 
must consider “the purpose for which the product is to be used, the 
magnitude of the risk, the burden of providing direct warnings to 
end users and the reliability of the intermediary as a conduit.”99 
A. Availability of the Defense. 
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the availability of 
the sophisticated intermediary defense depends on the knowledge 
of the intermediary—usually an employer, as in Gray—rather than 
that of the ultimate user of the material.100  Unlike the sophisticated 
user defense, however, the sophisticated intermediary defense is 
not a no-duty rule.101  The duty to warn continues to exist; it is 
merely the physical delivery of the warning that may shift from the 
supplier to the employer, where reasonable.102 
The court also noted that the bulk supplier defense falls within 
the sophisticated intermediary defense.103 The bulk supplier 
defense acknowledges that the burden of warning end users, if 
placed upon suppliers of bulk goods, might be costly, difficult, or 
even impossible.104  Thus, a bulk supplier may be able to fulfill its 
legal duty to warn end users by providing sufficient warning to its 
immediate purchasers, essentially making those purchasers 
“sophisticated.”105 
Although the court seemed to indicate that the generalized 
 
 96. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 278 (Minn. 2004). 
 97. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)). 
 98. Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 388 cmt. n (1965)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 277 (explaining that the sophisticated intermediary defense 
“focuses on the sophistication of the end user’s employer”). 
 101. Id. at 278 (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1197 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 280. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. (noting that the “defense is consistent with the federal regulation 
of hazardous chemicals, which requires the manufacturer to provide warnings to 
its purchasers. . . .”). 
16
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sophisticated intermediary defense would not apply to Badger,106 it 
did find that this bulk supplier defense—the “specialized version” 
of the doctrine107—likely did apply.  However, the court also 
determined that sufficient questions of fact remained to prevent 
summary judgment.108  This would seem to indicate that, except in 
exceptionally clear-cut circumstances, courts might be reluctant to 
take this determination out of the hands of a jury. 
B. The Sophistication of the Intermediary Will Probably Be Determined 
According to a Subjective Standard 
The appeals court held that Smith Foundry was a 
“sophisticated purchaser” of sand because it “knew or should have 
known of the dangers of silica.”109  In contrast, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found “issues of material fact” regarding whether 
“Smith Foundry’s knowledge was equal to that of Badger Mining” 
and whether “Smith Foundry shared in the special knowledge 
possessed by Badger Mining that disposable respirators were 
ineffective.”110  Although the supreme court did not specifically so 
state, its emphasis on Smith Foundry’s actual level of knowledge 
and its reliance on Badger’s warnings appears to implicate a 
subjective, rather than objective, standard.111 
Respondent Badger Mining’s brief to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court emphasized objective knowledge, as did both amicus briefs 
supporting Badger.112  All three briefs suggested that Smith 
 
 106. The court did not specifically state whether the defense would apply to 
Badger, but noted that “this case is more analogous to the decisions of other 
jurisdictions that have denied summary judgment to silica suppliers,” then 
mentioned three cases where courts refused to apply the defense.  Id. (citing 
White v. W.G.M. Safety Corp., 707 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1988); U.S. Silica v. 
Tompkins, 92 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App. 2002); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. 
Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App. 2001)). 
 107. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 281. 
 108. Id.  “Because genuine issues of material fact precluded the district court 
from deciding, as a matter of law, that Badger Mining had no duty to warn or that 
its warning to Smith Foundry discharged its duty, the district court did not err in 
denying summary judgment.”  Id. at 281–82. 
 109. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003), rev’d, 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004). 
 110. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278–79. 
 111. See id. at 279–280 (discussing Smith Foundry’s level of general and 
specific knowledge compared to Badger as well as its actual reliance on the 
warnings provided by Badger). 
 112. See Respondent’s Brief at 32, Gray (No. C4-02-2052) (“Smith Foundry 
knew or should have known how to control exposures to respirable sand particles 
17
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Foundry should have had the knowledge necessary to protect its 
employees from silicosis, thus insulating Badger from liability.113  
However, despite Respondent’s urging, the court’s opinion 
appeared to require suppliers to ascertain the actual level of 
knowledge—both general and specific—of their purchasers.  First, 
the court looked at whether Badger and Smith Foundry’s 
knowledge was “equal” regarding “the general risks of silica in 
foundry operations.”114  Next, the court examined the parties’ 
relative knowledge regarding the ineffectiveness of disposable 
respirators in preventing silicosis, before determining “there is no 
evidence that Badger Mining had reason to believe Smith Foundry 
had such special knowledge.”115  Finally, the court discussed in 
detail Smith Foundry’s actual reliance on Badger’s warnings.116  In 
other words, according to the Gray court, suppliers may not merely 
rely on general industry knowledge or warnings furnished by other 
suppliers to make an intermediary “sophisticated.”117  Instead, the 
court left the burden on suppliers to determine the subjective 
specialized knowledge of their purchaser—or else to provide 
adequate warnings. 
Even though industrial suppliers retain the duty to warn, 
however, the sophisticated intermediary doctrine still benefits 
them.  Functionally, the doctrine creates greater flexibility in how a 
supplier may provide its required warning.  A defendant supplier 
may now use “reasonable care in relying upon [an] intermediary to 
give the warning to the end user.”118  When combined with the bulk 
supplier defense, even a reasonableness standard provides a great 
 
. . . .”) (emphasis added); Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, 
Inc. and American Tort Reform Association at 14 (“[F]rom an objective standpoint, 
the potential risks associated with the use of industrial sand have been a matter of 
common knowledge among industrial sand users for many decades.  As a result, 
industrial sand suppliers have no duty to warn employers or users of the hazards 
associated with their products.") (emphasis added); Brief of Amici Curiae 
American Chemical Council at 5 (“Where . . . a purchaser knows or should know of 
potential hazards related to a product, a supplier of the product has no duty to 
warn the purchaser’s employees of such dangers.”) (emphasis added). 
 113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 114. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 279. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 279–80. 
 117. See id. at 279 (“Evidence of the . . . information that was available to Smith 
Foundry from government and industry publications, other sand suppliers, and 
the suppliers of respirators. . . . cannot be said to conclusively establish that Smith 
Foundry’s knowledge was equal to that of Badger Mining.”). 
 118. Id. at 278. 
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deal of protection for industrial defendants like Badger, because of 
the difficulty in directly reaching the product’s users (such as 
Gray).  Because this doctrine entails an individualized analysis 
rather than an inflexible rule, it is actually more likely to place the 
warning burden on the party best able to warn. 
C. Sophisticated Intermediary v. Sophisticated User 
As noted earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the no-duty approach to the sophisticated intermediary 
defense.119  As a result, the defense is further differentiated from 
the original sophisticated user defense, where there may in fact be 
no duty to warn if the end user (rather than the intermediary) is 
sufficiently knowledgeable.120  This makes sense.  If the end user is 
knowledgeable regarding the existence of a hazard, then any 
warning, whether provided by a supplier or an employer, would be 
redundant and unnecessary.  Failure to provide such a warning 
could not be a cause of the harm.  On the other hand, if the 
ultimate user is not sophisticated regarding a particular hazard, 
then the supplier and employer share a duty to warn of that 
danger,121 and fault for not doing so should be apportioned among 
the parties according to Minnesota comparative fault principles.122 
Arguments do exist for the no-duty approach to the 
sophisticated intermediary defense,123 but they tend to benefit 
defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs.  One such contention is 
that unpredictability among jurisdictions forces manufacturers to 
allocate inordinate resources to designing warnings, and 
manufacturers have little control over how those warnings are 
disseminated by intermediaries.124  Courts are then seen to be 
 
 119. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 (1992)). 
 120. Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 342, 156 N.W.2d 898, 
902 (1968).  The Hill court noted: “[I]f [the user] had adequate knowledge of the 
dangerous propensities of the product . . . no further duty rested . . . to give an 
additional warning.”  Id. 
 121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2003). 
 122. MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (2003). 
 123. See, e.g., Cheney, supra note 4, at 581 (advocating for “no obligation” 
version of learned intermediary defense); Joel Slawotsky, The Learned Intermediary 
Defense: The Employer as Intermediary, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 1059, 1059–60 (1995) 
(recommending adoption of “no-duty” version of defense). 
 124. Cheney, supra note 4, at 574 (criticizing unpredictability across 
jurisdictions; advocating adoption of learned intermediary defense for industrial 
users). 
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“punishing the manufacturer” when an intermediary is negligent in 
passing along a warning.125  However, these arguments do not take 
into account that manufacturers are virtually always the best source 
of information regarding generalized dangers of their products.126  
Additionally, federal regulations already mandate warnings to 
intermediary purchasers.127  Requiring a reasonable additional effort 
to determine that the appropriate end users will be warned, as 
Minnesota does, simply adds an extra layer of protection for those 
users. 
Proponents of the no-duty rule also argue that imposing 
complete liability on a sophisticated intermediary who fails to warn 
may create a stronger inducement for that intermediary, who is 
often closest to the end user and thus “best able to warn.”128  
However, this argument is weakened when the party best able to 
warn is the employer, which is shielded from liability to a large 
extent by workers’ compensation statutes.129  Additionally, a system 
that imposes liability only on a “sophisticated” intermediary may 
motivate a party to remain non-sophisticated.130  By adopting the 
reasonableness approach instead, the Minnesota court bypassed 
both problems.131 
 
 125. Slawotsky, supra note 123, at 1065 (asserting that manufacturer’s liability 
for informed intermediary’s failure to warn essentially functions as punishment of 
manufacturer). 
 126. Willner, supra note 1, at 586 (“Manufacturers are usually most 
knowledgeable about their products . . . .”).  In Minnesota, “a manufacturer is held 
to the skill of an expert in its particular field of endeavor, and is obligated to keep 
informed of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning that field.”  Karjala v. 
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 127. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274–75 (Minn. 2004); see 
also Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 9–11, Gray (No. C4-02-2052) 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(1) regarding labeling of hazardous chemicals 
and provision of warnings to purchasers). 
 128. Willner, supra note 1, at 595 (asserting that no-duty rule creates greatest 
likelihood of warning to end users). 
 129. Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds by 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993). 
 130. Willner, supra note 1, at 595–96 (noting intermediaries might deliberately 
remain ignorant to avoid liability and expense of warning). 
 131. For a clearly written discussion of the arguments regarding the 
reasonableness approach versus the no-duty approach, see Dole Food Co., Inc. v. 
N.C. Foam Indus., Inc., 935 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).  The Dole opinion 
states, in part: 
[T]he Restatement rule also encourages sellers to warn intermediaries, 
and any greater incentive to do so offered by the duty rule is offset by its 
disadvantages, the principal one of which is that it drastically reduces the 
incentive for sellers to notify end users.  An important source of product 
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D. Sophisticated Intermediary v. Learned Intermediary 
In addition to rejecting a no-duty approach to the 
sophisticated intermediary defense, the Gray court also 
differentiated it from the pharmaceutical learned intermediary 
defense.132  Minnesota courts applying the learned intermediary 
defense employ proximate cause analysis: when a fully informed 
doctor fails to warn a patient, the patient’s harm is not proximately 
caused by the manufacturer’s failure to warn.133  In contrast, the 
sophisticated intermediary doctrine focuses on the knowledge of 
the end user’s employer, “on the premise that the employer will act 
in the best interest of its employees.”134 
Another difference is that medical practices are 
distinguishable from industrial practices.  A drug manufacturer 
may rely on the individual doctor–patient relationship, and a 
negligent physician is subject to malpractice liability.135  In contrast, 
the industrial employer deals with many employees on a less 
personal level, and is largely protected from negligence liability by 
workers’ compensation statutes,136 hence the court’s decision to 
define two distinct defenses. 
Because the Gray court deliberately differentiated between 
learned and sophisticated intermediaries, the outcome of each 
defense should be distinct.  The court’s self-imposed limitations 
prevent such a clear separation, however. As it stands, the 
sophisticated intermediary defense functions similarly to the 
learned intermediary defense: a supplier’s duty can be 
discharged—but not absolved—by adequate warning to an 
 
warnings is thereby virtually eliminated. 
The second alleged advantage of the duty approach is that it encourages 
intermediaries to warn end users.  However, the duty rule does not affect 
the intermediary’s duty. . . . [I]f the intermediary is . . . an employer, its 
behavior is governed by the workers’ compensation scheme under both 
the duty and Restatement approaches. 
Id. at 881 n.5. 
 132. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 275–76. 
 133. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 336, 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 
(1970). 
 134. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 277. 
 135. Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(quoting Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1519–20 (D. Conn. 1986)), 
overruled on other grounds by Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54 
(Minn. 1993). 
 136. Id. 
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intermediary.137  However, Gray does suggest how future decisions 
may distinguish between the two doctrines.  The court implies that 
an industrial defendant should face a greater challenge in proving 
its warning was adequate because certain safeguards exist to protect 
medical patients that are not available to industrial or other 
employees.138 
 
V. THE FUTURE OF GRAY 
 
A. Recommendation: Sophisticated Intermediary Doctrine Should Apply 
Only to the Industrial Employment Context 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not use Gray to “decide the 
full applicability or scope” of the sophisticated intermediary 
doctrine.139  Indeed, by using the name “sophisticated intermediary” 
rather than “sophisticated employer,” the court left open the 
question of exactly what types of intermediaries might be 
implicated.  In view of the court’s initial analysis of the defense, 
which refers solely to “employers,”140 it seems likely that the 
majority of intermediaries qualifying as “sophisticated” will be 
employers, especially because of the court’s limitation of its 
holding.141  Given the ambiguity of the doctrine’s name, however, 
its application is not as clearly defined as it could be. 
As noted earlier, the court declined to extend the learned 
intermediary doctrine beyond the medical context because of the 
specific nature of the physician-patient relationship.142  Sufficient 
parallels exist for similarly restricting the sophisticated 
intermediary defense to employers.  Although not the intense, one-
on-one relationship seen between doctor and patient, an 
intermediary employer exercises a certain level of control over its 
end user employees.  This control is not shared by other 
 
 137. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 279 n.7 (explaining that, even under the learned 
intermediary defense, drug manufacturer cannot be completely relieved of duty to 
warn patient). 
 138. Id. at 276 n.5 (citing with approval the learned intermediary discussion in 
Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 79, and Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1519–20). 
 139. Id. at 278. 
 140. Id. at 277. 
 141. Id. at 281. 
 142. See id. at 276 (declining “to extend the learned intermediary defense to 
the employer/employee relationship in the industrial context,” but noting that a 
similar defense was permitted in Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein, 
354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984)). 
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intermediaries and their end users.  For example, employers may 
require employees to read and heed warnings, to attend safety 
meetings, and to take specific training—or get fired. 
Employers are also legislatively required to provide safety 
training to employees regarding particular hazards of their 
workplaces.143  Individuals who might not otherwise heed warnings 
are more likely to pay attention and derive some benefit when 
acknowledging warnings is a part of their job requirements.  
Additionally, most individuals are aware that longer-term, day-to-
day exposure to harmful materials encountered on the job may 
cause more damage than any shorter-term exposure encountered 
outside the workplace.  Employees are thus more motivated than 
other end users to notice and heed warnings. 
In contrast, intermediaries such as vendors who sell to 
individual consumers have less control over how warnings are 
received, and do not benefit from any equivalent to workers 
compensation insurance.144  The danger is greater that warnings 
will get lost in transit from supplier to end user, and greater care is 
needed to ensure that warnings actually reach ultimate users.  If 
these suppliers are able to invoke the sophisticated intermediary 
doctrine, there will be less protection for both intermediary and 
end user than the Gray court appears to envision.145 
Thus, because of the greater likelihood that necessary 
warnings might not reach non-employee end users, the 
sophisticated intermediary doctrine is best suited for the 
employment context.  Not only are employers in the best position 
to actually become “sophisticated” intermediaries as intended by 
the court in Gray,146 but they enjoy greater protection from liability 
 
 143. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers at 10, Gray (No. C4-02-
2052) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMIN., Chemical Hazard Communication, OSHA Publ. No. 3084, at 2 
(1989)). 
 144. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Chemistry Council at 2, Gray 
(No. C4-02-2052) (noting “significant distinctions between the consumer and the 
industrial contexts . . . including the complex interdependency of modern 
business relationships and the intricate regulatory environment governing 
workplace safety”). 
 145. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting with approval from Kennedy v. 
Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff’d, 601 A.2d 123 
(1992)).  The Kennedy version of the defense requires that, if direct warnings were 
not feasible, the supplier must have “acted in a manner reasonably calculated to 
assure either that the necessary information would be passed on to the ultimate 
handlers of the product or that their safety would otherwise be attended to.”  Id. 
 146. See Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 277–78 (An intermediary is sophisticated where 
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along with better capabilities of passing along effective warnings. 
B. The Adoption of Specific Affirmative Defenses Will Weed Out Frivolous 
and Weak Claims 
The current state of products liability law in Minnesota reflects 
the existence of a legal duty to warn as a question of law to be 
decided by a court, rather than a jury.147  This gives Minnesota 
judges a fair amount of power to decide failure to warn claims.148  
In the case of the sophisticated user defense, this is probably 
appropriate; if the user is suitably knowledgeable, there should be 
no failure to warn claim in the first place.  In less clear-cut 
situations, such as where the end user is not sophisticated, the 
court is willing to adopt a mixed approach that requires a closer 
analysis of the specific facts—thus, the balancing test required for 
the sophisticated intermediary doctrine. 
Despite dire predictions that unless the court adopts a harsh, 
bright-line, no-duty sophisticated intermediary defense, Minnesota 
will become a silicosis plaintiff’s paradise—a “magic jurisdiction” 
facing “an influx of suits, overcrowded dockets, and wasted judicial 
resources”149—the Minnesota Supreme Court wisely refused to 
create a new absolute defense for suppliers.  Instead, the court 
sought a middle ground, creating greater flexibility for itself. 
This is not to say that industrial suppliers have been left wide 
 
“(1) the end user’s employer already has a full range of knowledge of the dangers, 
equal to that of the supplier or (2) the supplier makes the employer 
knowledgeable by providing adequate warnings and instructions to the 
employer.”).  Note that the definition is exclusive to employers.  Id. 
 147. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (citing Prosser 
and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 37, (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 328B (1965)); see also Steenson, supra note 3, at 25 (“[U]nder both 
negligence and strict liability standards, adequacy is the only issue the jury will 
resolve. The jury will not determine whether a reasonable manufacturer would 
have provided warnings and if so, what warnings would have been adequate.”). 
 148. This power continues to be somewhat controversial.  Some commentators 
have suggested that following Germann, Minnesota courts have improperly taken 
on the role of determining whether the standard of care has been met in any 
particular case.  See generally Soule & Moen, supra note 12 (proposing that courts 
should determine only the standard of conduct—i.e., reasonable care—and leave 
to juries the question of what that standard entails and whether it has been met); 
George W. Flynn & John J. Laravuso, The Existence of a Duty to Warn: A Question for 
the Court or the Jury, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 648 (2000) (“The courts should 
not determine alone the existence of a duty to warn.  When the issue turns on a 
reasonably disputed foreseeability . . . the jury should resolve the dispute.”). 
 149. Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. and American 
Tort Reform Association at 6, Gray (No. C4-02-2052). 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/11
NELSON (CB & CKI & LSK) 11/14/2004  6:01:39 PM 
2004] SHADES OF GRAY 683 
open to failure to warn liability; in fact, overall, Gray will probably 
have the opposite effect.  Even though the Gray court essentially 
found for the plaintiff, its clarification of the defenses available to 
suppliers—specifically, its adoption of the sophisticated 
intermediary and bulk supplier defenses—means that industrial 
suppliers have greater flexibility in how they provide their 
warnings.  Indeed, the Gray court found that the bulk supplier 
defense would probably have applied to Badger.150 
As noted earlier, Minnesota now has both a no-duty doctrine 
for sophisticated users and a reasonableness test for sophisticated 
intermediaries.  This means that defendant suppliers have two 
different arguments to make—and two possible methods to defeat 
a plaintiff’s claim.151  When combined with the bulk supplier and 
raw material/component part defenses (and other defenses not 
discussed here, such as “open and obvious danger”),152 these 
defenses present a formidable arsenal for defendant suppliers. 
At the same time, plaintiffs who are not sophisticated users 
(and whose claims are therefore stronger) may have a better 
chance of reaching a jury, because the defenses available to the 
supplier in that case—sophisticated intermediary and bulk 
supplier—require significant fact-based determination.  This means 
that a few more claims may be filed in Minnesota than in a 
jurisdiction with a more rigid defense.  However, with the catalog 
of defenses outlined in Gray, the court has given itself the tools to 
weed through these cases quickly.  To prevail, plaintiffs must defeat 
the entire list of defenses; as a result, the weakest claims will be 
 
 150. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 280, 281 (Minn. 2004). 
 151. If one thinks of sophisticated user as a “duty-oriented” doctrine and 
sophisticated intermediary as a “balancing” doctrine, the difference in approach 
can be distinguished as follows: 
The duty-oriented analysis is relatively predictable—a desirable 
characteristic because it provides some assurance to producers and 
suppliers that their communication structures will pass muster in the 
courts.  However, like most per se rules, the duty approach sometimes 
sacrifices fairness for administrative efficiency.  The balancing approach, 
on the other hand, is more equitable in nature, but is less certain in its 
application, than the duty-oriented approach.  This uncertainty makes it 
difficult for parties to predict when they may safely rely upon 
intermediaries to convey safety information to users or consumers. 
Ausness, supra note 55, at 1224–25. 
 152. The “open and obvious” danger doctrine is well established in Minnesota: 
“[n]or is there any duty to warn of nonexisting dangers, or dangers that are 
obvious to anyone.” Westerberg v. Sch. Dist. No. 792, Todd County, 276 Minn. 1, 
10, 148 N.W.2d 312, 317 (1967). 
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dismissed or never filed at all, but stronger claims will be 
adjudicated more equitably, under a reasonableness standard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As Justice Simonett has pointed out, 
[w]e live in a post-industrial society characterized by 
rapidly advancing technology . . . at a time when there is a 
clamor for ‘tort reform’ . . . presumably based on a 
perceived imbalance in what is fair to require of the 
producer-seller of products as compared to what is fair for 
the user-consumer to expect.  In the nature of things, 
these two interests will always be in a state of tension and 
aberrations will occur.  But generally speaking, over the 
past thirty years, products liability law has kept in mind its 
purpose to provide, fairly, products that are reasonably 
safe.153 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, by introducing the 
sophisticated intermediary doctrine, carefully negotiated the tort 
reform tightrope described by Justice Simonett.  The Gray opinion 
attempts to balance the rights of industrial sand providers with the 
health and safety interests of industrial employees.  Although the 
Gray court was reviewing a denial of summary judgment and thus 
did not decide the “applicability or scope” of the sophisticated 
intermediary defense,154 it did provide some direction for future 
courts.  The Gray court indicated that, for a supplier to discharge its 
duty to warn of a general risk (such as the danger of inhaling silica 
particles), the intermediary’s knowledge must be equal to the 
supplier’s.155  Additionally, if a supplier has special knowledge (such 
as the ineffectiveness of disposable respirators in protecting against 
silica inhalation) the supplier must share its knowledge unless it 
has reason to believe the intermediary already has that exact 
knowledge.156  In both cases, the focus remains on the supplier’s 
duty to the user.157  In Minnesota, then, a supplier’s duty to warn a 
non-sophisticated end user cannot be delegated or abrogated—
only discharged by reasonable care. 
 
 153. Simonett, supra note 17, at 368 (proposing that despite some problems, 
products liability law is evolving to meet the needs of litigants on both sides, 
especially through the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability). 
 154. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278. 
 155. Id. at 279. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 278. 
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Minnesota’s “reasonableness” approach attempts to find a 
middle ground between suppliers and end users. If an end user is 
well informed, a court may still use the original sophisticated user 
defense to find that the supplier had no duty to warn.158  If an end 
user is not sophisticated, courts must look to the conduct of the 
supplier in getting the warning to the end user, either directly or 
through an intermediary.159  If the supplier’s conduct was 
reasonable, the supplier is protected by the sophisticated 
intermediary defense. 
In general, the adoption of specific defenses offers some 
clarification to industrial suppliers as to what is expected of them in 
terms of warning ultimate users.  Suppliers also have a better 
chance to achieve a fair result in failure to warn litigation; when 
they can show that the ultimate user of their product was 
sufficiently knowledgeable, the court may find that they had no 
duty at all to warn. 
On the other hand, the Gray court simultaneously adopted a 
reasonableness doctrine for use when the end user is not 
sophisticated.  It also declined to extend the broader, learned 
intermediary defense.  This means that the court is continuing to 
protect non-sophisticated end users and maintain the deterrence 
effect intended by the common law duty to warn.  Manufacturers 
must still take all available steps to warn these end users and cannot 
simply rely on employers or other intermediaries without good 
reason.160  When they fail in their duty, and plaintiffs are harmed, 
recovery is still possible under corrective justice principles. 
By applying a well-reasoned, multifaceted approach to failure 
to warn litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Gray 
emphasized individual justice over brute efficiency and “one-size-
fits all” solutions. 
 
 
 158. Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 345, 156 N.W.2d 898, 
904 (1968). 
 159. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 278. 
 160. Id. (noting that supplier’s reliance on intermediary must be reasonable). 
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